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CASE COMMENT
THE LACK OF PRE-EMPTION FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
HOW JURIES HAVE REPLACED THE FDA AS
MEDICAL EXPERTS
MUT. PHARM. CO. v. BARTLETT, 133 S. CT. 2466 (2012)
Deryk Loiacono*

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Karen Bartlett, suffered serious injuries' after ingesting a
generic form of Clinoril®, sulindac, 2 manufactured by Defendant,
Mutual Pharmaceutical. 3 Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in New
Hampshire state court to recover damages for Plaintiffs injuries.4
Plaintiff filed a design defect claim and a failure to warn claim alleging
that the generic drug's label5 inadequately warned of the risk of
developing certain severe skin reactions. 6 Defendant removed the suit to
federal court. 7 The District Court dismissed the failure to warn claim.
A jury awarded Plaintiff twenty-one million dollars based on
Plaintiffs design defect claim.9 The First Circuit affirmed, holding that
* Deryk Loiacono, J.D. Candidate, May 2015, University of Florida Levin College of
Law; Pharm.D., University of Florida, 2012. 1 would like to thank my wife for her love and
support.
1. The patient's physician prescribed the patient the medication to treat shoulder pain.
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2012). After ingesting the medication, the
patient developed an acute case of toxic epidermal necrolysis. Id Approximately 60-65% of the
surface of the patient's body deteriorated resulting in the surface burning off or turning into an
open wound. Id The patient spent months in a medically induced coma, underwent 12 eye
surgeries, and was tube-fed for a year. Id. The patient currently has a number of physical
disabilities and is nearly blind. Id.
2. Id Sulindac is a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory prescription drug used to treat
shoulder pain. Sulindac, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY, http://www.clinicalpharmacology-ip.com/
Forms/Monograph/monograph.aspx?cpnum=584&sec=mondesc&t=-0 (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
3. Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2466.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2472. The generic drug label for sulindac contained a warning that the drug may
cause "severe skin reactions," but did not specifically caution against the risk of developing
Stevens-Johnson Syndrome or toxic epidermal necrolysis. Id. However, the package insert that is
given to doctors rather than patients did mention Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal
necrolysis as potential adverse reactions. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2472.
8. Id. The District Court dismissed the failure to warn claim based upon the doctor's
admission that the doctor did not read the package insert or box label. Id.
9. Id
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neither the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) nor the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) regulations pre-empted Plaintiff's design defect
claim as Defendant could comply with federal and state law by simply
choosing not to make the drug. 10 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari, reversed, and HELD, that design defect claims that turn on the
adequacy of a generic drug's warnings are pre-empted by federal law,
which expressly prohibits manufacturers of generic drugs from making
any unilateral changes to the drug's label."
HISTORY

The FDCA requires manufacturers of brand-name or-generic drugs to
acquire FDA approval of the drug's safety and effectiveness prior to
marketing the drug in interstate commerce. 2 Once approved, brand-name
drug manufacturers are generally prohibited from unilaterally making
any major changes to a drug's label.' 3 Likewise, generic drug
manufacturers are required to match the label of the brand-name drug
counterpart.' 4 In addition, under the Supremacy Clause,' 5 state laws
that
16
conflict with federal law are without effect and thus pre-empted.
The Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of express pre-emption as
it relates to medical devices in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.17 In Riegel, a
patient brought common law claims against a device manufacturer after
suffering injuries that resulted from the use of a device that the label for
the device specifically cautioned against. 18 An issue in Riegel was
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2470.
12. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
13. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2014).
14. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94 (2014); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2014) (approval of a generic
drug may be withdrawn if the generic drug's label is no longer consistent with the label of the
brand-name drug).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws
of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
16. Maryland v. Louisiana, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2129 (1981).
17. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).
18. Id. The patient underwent an angioplasty after suffering a myocardial infarction. Id.
The doctor decided to use the manufacturer's balloon catheter during the procedure in order to
dilate the patient's artery. Id. The catheter's label warned that the catheter should not be inflated
above the rated burst pressure of eight atmospheres. Id. During the procedure, the doctor inflated
the catheter to a pressure of ten atmospheres. Id. In addition, the catheter's label contained a
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whether a patient's common law claims' 9 were pre-empted by the pre20
emption clause in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)
that challenged the safety and effectiveness of a medical device that
received pre-market approval. 2 ' More specifically, the Supreme Court
considered whether common law claims were considered different or
additional requirements to the federal requirements of a pre-market
approval and thus expressly pre-empted by the MDA.22
The Supreme Court held that the MDA expressly pre-empted the
patient's common law claims, determining that the state common law
duties were requirements that were "different from, or in addition to," the
federal requirements. 23 The Supreme Court further determined that premarket approvals of medical devices served as a specific safety and
effectiveness review of that particular device. 24 Because the pre-market
approval of a device served as a federal safety and effectiveness review,
and the state common law duties were in addition to the federal
requirements of a safety and effectiveness approval, the Supreme Court
held that the pre-emption clause of the MDA pre-empted the common
law claims.
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court considered whether the FDA
approval of a brand-name drug's label pre-empted a patient's failure to
warn claim against the brand-name drug manufacturer. 26 The patient
suffered serious injuries following the intravenous (IV)-push
administration of Wyeth's brand-name drug. 27 The drug label cautioned
contraindication in which the catheter should not be used in patients with diffuse or calcified
stenosis. Id. at 315. The patient in this case had a right coronary artery that was diffusely diseased
and heavily calcified, but the doctor used the catheter despite this contraindication. Id. The
catheter subsequently ruptured and the patient developed heart block. Id. The patient then
underwent emergency coronary bypass surgery as a result of the heart block. Id.
19. The patient brought claims of strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and
negligence in the design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale of a
catheter following injuries after the doctor's misuse of the manufacturer's balloon catheter. Id.

20.

21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012):
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in
addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2)
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.

21.

Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322-23.

22.

Id.

23.
24.

Id. at 330.
Id. at 323.

25.

Id. at 330.

26.
27.

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558 (2009).
Id. The patient received IV-push administration of the drug manufacturer's brand name
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the higher risk of the drug escaping a patient's vein associated with the
IV-push method as compared to the [V-drip method. 28 The patient filed a
failure to warn claim stating that the warning inadequately cautioned
against the risk of using the IV-push method. 29 The brand-name drug
manufacturer argued that the FDCA's regulations concerning alterations
to the drug label pre-empted the failure to warn claim because the state
common law duties made it impossible for the brand-name drug
manufacturer to comply with both the FDCA's regulations and the state
common law duties.30 Furthermore, the brand-name drug manufacturer
argued that it could not change the label using the "changes being
effected" (CBE) 3 ' regulation because it did not have any newly acquired
32
information.

The Wyeth Court held that federal law did not pre-empt the failure to
warn claim because of the CBE regulation. 33 The 2008 amendment to the
CBE regulation allowed manufacturers to unilaterally change the label
upon obtaining "newly acquired information." 34 In determining that
federal law did not pre-empt the failure to warn claim, the Supreme Court
found that "newly acquired information" includes both new data as well
as a reanalysis of previously submitted data.35 The dissent notably
focused on federal law's reliance on an FDA approval of a prescription
drug and thus conflict pre-emption should have prevented the failure to

drug Phenergan®, used to treat nausea. Id. The patient developed gangrene and the patient's entire
left forearm had to be amputated as a result of the gangrene. Id.
28. Id. If a drug is administered via the IV-push method, the drug is injected directly into
the patient's vein. Id. If a drug is administered via the IV-drip method, the drug is injected into a
saline solution in a hanging intravenous bag. Id. Once the drug is placed in the hanging bag, the
drug slowly descends into a catheter inserted into the patient's vein. Id. When a drug is injected
into a patient's vein by either method, the drug can escape the patient's veins by one of two ways.
Id. First, the drug can escape the patient's vein if the needle used to inject the drug penetrates the
vein. Id. Second, the drug can escape through a phenomenon known as perivascular extravasation,
in which the drug escapes the vein into surrounding tissue. Id. Using the IV-push method creates
a higher risk of the drug escaping the patient's vein since it is injected directly into the vein. Id. If
Phenergan® escapes a patient's artery, the patient may develop irreversible gangrene due to the
corrosiveness of the drug. Id.
29. Id.at 559. The patient argued that the warning should have instructed clinicians to use
the IV-drip method rather than the IV-push method. Id.
30. Id.at 568.
31. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2014). The CBE regulation allowed manufacturers to unilaterally
change the drug label without FDA approval upon filing a supplemental application only if the
manufacturer is changing the label to "add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution,
or adverse reaction" or to "add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that
is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product." Id.
32. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568.
33. Id. at 573.
34. Id.at 568.
35. Id.at 569.
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36

warn claim.
The Supreme Court subsequently addressed the issue of pre-emption
as it relates to a generic drug manufacturer's responsibility for the
contents of its generic drug's label.37 In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, a patient
brought a failure to warn claim against a generic drug manufacturer 38 that
produced the drug metoclopramide. 39 The patient alleged that the
manufacturer's label inadequately warned of the risk of developing
tardive dyskinesia 40 associated with the long-term use of
metoclopramide. 4 1 The manufacturer argued that federal laws regarding
the labels of generic drugs pre-empted the failure to warn claim because
the state common law duties made it impossible for the generic drug
manufacturer to comply with both federal and state law.42
The Supreme Court held that federal law pre-empted state laws that
imposed a duty on generic drug manufacturers to change a generic drug's
label.43 The Supreme Court distinguished PLIVA from Wyeth due to the
fact that brand-name manufacturers had the possibility of changing the
label through the CBE regulation. 4 However, generic drug
manufacturers did not have that same option as generic drug
manufacturers must match the labels of their generic drugs to the labels
of the corresponding brand-name drugs.45 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court determined that federal law pre-empted the failure to warn claim
as complying with the state imposed duty would directly violate federal
law.

46

36. Id. at 606 (Alito, J., dissenting).
37. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011).
38. Id.
39. Id. Metoclopramide is the generic form of the brand-name drug Reglan®.
Metoclopramide, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY, http://www.clinicalpharmacology-ip.com/Forms/
Monograph/monograph.aspx?cpnum=757&sec=mondesc&t=0 (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
Metoclopramide is a prokinetic and antiemetic drug used to treat nausea and several digestive
tract problems. Id.
40. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2573. Tardive dyskinesia is a side effect associated with the
long-term use of metoclopramide. Metoclopramide,supra note 39. Tardive dyskinesia consists of
involuntary, repetitive tic-like movements primarily in the facial muscles but may also occur in
limbs, fingers, and toes. Id. Tardive dyskinesia associated with metoclopramide use is most often
permanent and difficult to treat. Id.
41. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2573.
42. Id.
43. Id. at2581.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2575.
46. Id. at 2582.
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INSTANT CASE

The instant case required an application and expansion of PLIVA. The
First Circuit avoided the pre-emption issue by arguing that generic
manufacturers can comply with state and federal law by simply not
marketing the product in that particular state.47 The Supreme Court flatly
rejected this notion 48 and determined that, similar to PLIVA, the design
defect claim turned on whether a generic drug manufacturer may
unilaterally strengthen a waring.49 As the Supreme Court found that
federal law pre-empted the design defect claim, 5° the instant case expands
the field of pre-emption for generic drug manufacturers to include not
only failure to warn claims, but also
design defect claims that turn on the
51
waming.
drug's
the
of
adequacy
In the instant case, New Hampshire design defect claims imposed
affirmative duties on manufacturers to design products to be reasonably
safe.52 In assessing whether a drug is unreasonably dangerous, New
Hampshire employed a risk-utility approach looking at three factors: (1)
the usefulness of the product; (2) whether the risk of the danger could be
reduced without significantly affecting the cost and effectiveness of the
product; and (3) the presence and adequacy of a warning.53 The Supreme
Court found that the first two factors required the manufacturer to alter
54
the product's design-which was not possible and thus not at issue.
Therefore, the manufacturer could
only ameliorate the risk-utility
55
warning.
the
altering
by
analysis
As PLIVA made clear, federal law prevented generic drug
manufactures from unilaterally changing the label. 56 Therefore, the
manufacturer could not take remedial action to avoid liability under state
law.57 Since the manufacturer could not possibly comply with both state
and federal law, the Supreme 58
Court determined that federal law preempted the design defect claim.

47. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2012).
48. Id. at 2470.
49. Id. at 2475.
50. Id. at 2470.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2474.
53. Id. at 2475.
54. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 3550)(2)(A)(ii-v) (2012) (the generic drug must have the
same active ingredient, dosage form, strength, route of administration, and rate and extent of
absorption as the brand-name counterpart).
55. Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2475.
56. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
57. Id.
58. Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
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ANALYSIS

Since generic drugs have entered the market, the FDA has ensured
generic drugs contain the same active ingredients, dosage form, strength,
and other bioequivalency standards. 59 In addition, generic drugs are
generally eighty to eighty-five percent cheaper than the brand-name
counterpart. 60 Thus, whena consumer is provided the option to purchase
a generic or brand-name drug, the generic is chosen most often. Because
of these considerations, generic drugs account for approximately
eighty
61
America.
in
consumed
drugs
prescription
the
percent of
As greater numbers of consumers purchase generic drugs, they often
do not realize they will be without legal recourse if they suffer an injury
from the generic drug.62 In affirming and expanding PLIVA, the instant
case held that generic drug state design defect claims are pre-empted
under federal law. 63 Therefore, generic drug manufacturers are protected
against liability while the brand-name drug manufacturers are still liable
for design defect and failure to warn claims. 64 Consumers are essentially
choosing to pay less up front for generic drugs, but they may have to pay
far more if they are injured as a result of taking those drugs.
However, in November 2013, the FDA proposed a new rule that
would provide a CBE regulation for generic drug manufacturers. 6 5 If the
generic drug formulation of the CBE is interpreted in the same manner as
the CBE regulation for brand-name drugs, then consumers of generic
drugs will not be without legal recourse. But would this result prove
beneficial? And, considering that FDA review teams consist of medical
doctors, chemists, statisticians, microbiologists, pharmacologists, and
other experts, should state tort juries,66rather than the FDA, regulate the
warning labels of prescription drugs?

An alternative analysis of the pre-emption field of prescription drug
products as a whole traces back to the dissent in Wyeth. In Wyeth, the
dissent focused on the federal law's reliance on the FDA's determination
59. Facts About GenericDrugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., availableat http://www.fda.
gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggenericdrugs/u
cml67991.htm.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Marie Boyd, Unequal Protection Under the Law: Why FDA Should Use Negotiated
Rulemaking to Reform the Regulation of GenericDrugs, 35 CARDOZO L. REv. 1525, 1527 (2014).
63. Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
64. Boyd, supra note 62, at 1527.
65. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 314 and 601).
66. Mary K. Olson, PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REv. 393, 396 (2009).
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that a drug product is safe and effective. 67 The FDA approval of a drug is
quite rigorous, as it generally demands at least three phases of clinical
trials to determine safety and effectiveness. 68 In addition, the FDA
thoroughly examines the drug's label to further assess the safety and
effectiveness of the drug. 69 The FDA will only approve the drug if the
drug is safe under the suggested uses on the label, there is evidence that
effect described on the label, and the label is not
the drug will have the
70
misleading.
or
false
Considering what it takes to obtain FDA approval, the dissent in
Wyeth turned to the doctrine of conflict pre-emption. 71 The principles of
conflict pre-emption turn on whether a state has upset the regulatory
balance struck by the federal agency. 72 In Wyeth, the dissent determined
that the FDA approval of the drug's label pre-empted the tort suit, even
though the CBE regulation was in effect. 73 More specifically, the dissent
found that the FDA and drug manufacturer strengthened and altered the
drug's label multiple times for a period of thirty-four years when
assessing the adequacy of the warning. 74 Since the FDA approved the
strengthened warnings, the dissent believed that the state tort suit
upset the regulatory
challenging the adequacy of the warning would
75
balance struck by the FDA regarding drug labels.
Consistent with the dissent in Wyeth, other fields in medical
technology provide guidance on whether an FDA approval should preempt state tort claims.76 A prescription drug product's FDA approval is
as rigorous, if not more rigorous, than a medical device's pre-market
approval. 77 Likewise, an FDA approval of a medical device and
prescription drug consists of a federal review of the device or drug's
safety and effectiveness. 78 However, medical devices that receive pre67. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 606 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
68. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2014).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
71. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 610 (Alito, J., dissenting).
72. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865-68 (2000).
73. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 610 (Alito, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 612-19. The patient in Wyeth was injured in 2000. Id. at 559. As of 2000, the
label consisted of several warnings including, but not limited to: a full page discussing the use of
the Tubex system that is used only for IV-push administration; cautioning against the use of
plungers with rigid needles to protect against puncturing a vein; the warning that
"INADVERTENT INTRA-ARTERIAL INJECTION CAN RESULT IN GANGRENE OF THE
AFFECTED EXTREMITY" in bold letters; directing medical professionals to choose veins
wisely when using the IV-push method; and a warning against the risk of aspiration that is only
associated with the use of the IV-push method. Id. at 612-19.
75. Id. at 621.
76. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
77. Wyeth, 555 US at 607-08 (Alito, J., dissenting).
78. See id.
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market approval are protected from state common law duties 79 by an
express pre-emption clause within the MIDA, 80 while prescription drugs
are not. 81
The MDA prevents states from establishing any requirement in
addition to the requirements of the MDA that relates to the safety and
effectiveness of the device. 82 The Supreme Court held that state common
law duties were additional requirements under the MDA, and thus
common law claims were pre-empted by federal law. 83 On the other hand,
the FDCA does not contain any language similar to that effect, hence
84
express pre-emption is not applicable for prescription drug products.
However, as discussed earlier, the dissent in Wyeth believed that conflict
pre-emption should still prevent a common law claim. 85 Therefore,
similar to a pre-market approval of a medical device, the FDA's approval
of a prescription drug should pre-empt state common law claims
challenging the safety and effectiveness
of the drug based upon the
86
doctrine of conflict pre-emption.
This alternative approach to the pre-emption field for prescription
drug products could lead to harsh results for some patients. However,
drug manufacturers spend billions of dollars and years of scientific
research to obtain FDA approval for a prescription drug product.87
Likewise, FDA approval consists of three phases of clinical trials and a
review of the manufacturing process, packaging, and labeling of the
prescription drug. 88 In the end, the FDA approval is a cost-benefit
89
analysis that balances the drug's safety, quality, and efficacy.
In contrast to the FDA's analysis, juries see only the cost of expensive
improvements or changes-not the benefits of those changes. 90 Juries
91
also do not see the patients that benefitted from the FDA approved drug.
Rather, jury members see only an injured party and do not apply cost79. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
80. 21 U.S.C. §360k (2012).
81. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 609 (Alito, J., dissenting).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012).
83. Riegel, 552 S. Ct. at 330.
84. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 609 (Alito, J., dissenting).
85. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
86. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869-70 (2000) (holding that the absence
of an express pre-emption clause does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles).
87. Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class Action
Litigation: Bio-Pharmasand the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J.

CoRP. L.
88.
89.
90.
91.

911, 916 (2010).
Id. at917-18.
Id. at 919.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008).
Id.
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benefit analyses. 92 If juries continuously increase the liability of
prescription drug manufacturers, these manufacturers would cover the
costs of liability by increasing the price of prescription drugs. As a result,
overall healthcare costs would continue to increase.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court reached the correct judgment in the
instant case, the rationale of the decision is imperfect as is the rationale
of previous cases addressing pre-emption in the prescription drug arena.
The dissent in Wyeth reached the correct conclusion in which the
expertise of an FDA drug panel consisting of medical doctors, chemists,
statisticians, microbiologists, pharmacologists, and other experts should
control the labeling of prescription drugs, not state tort juries.93 Although
there is no express pre-emption clause in the FDCA, the doctrine of
conflict pre-emption should prevent additional state requirements to the
safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs.
Once the new CBE regulation for generic drug manufacturers is
passed, the decisions in PLIVA and the instant case will essentially be
nullified as both cases were premised on the absence of a CBE regulation
for generic drug manufacturers. Therefore, all drug manufacturers will
now be susceptible to additional safety and effectiveness requirements
arising from state tort duties. Is this the appropriate course of action? If
so, drug manufacturers will respond by increasing the price of
prescription drug products, thus increasing the overall healthcare costs.
Moreover, the associated costs of liability may dissuade manufacturers
from developing new products that could benefit many patients.

92.
93.

Id.
Id.

